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Abstract 
Many have argued that Supreme Court decisions on culture war issues, issues that cause 
conflict between conservative and liberal values, stifle public progression on the very problems 
they are meant to resolve. They often cite political and electoral backlash following a decision as 
evidence of this stagnation in opinion. However, this backlash may not be representative of 
widespread public opinion. In order to understand the relationship between Court decisions and 
public opinion, changes in opinion on culture war issues following a Supreme Court ruling must 
be measured. This study utilizes national and state survey data in order to examine this 
relationship. It measures changes in support for same-sex marriage nationwide as well as in the 
state of Kentucky following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
which legalized same-sex marriage nationwide. Changes in support for same-sex marriage 
among various racial groups, religious groups, and members of political parties following 
Obergefell are also assessed. Findings show that Court decisions precede changes in overall 
support as well as changes in the gaps in support between racial groups, religious groups, and 
parties. Changes in nationwide support following Obergefell did not reach significance; 
therefore, the effect of the decision on support could not be measured. Changes in support on the 
state level following the ruling also could not be determined because of differences in question 
wording following the decision. Future research should utilize survey data with consistent 
questions before and after the Court’s ruling in order to adequately examine changes in support 
for same-sex marriage. It should also control for other variables in order to isolate the effect of 
Court decisions.  
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
The Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin spurred political and 
electoral backlash against same-sex marriage. Although the decision was not binding, the Court’s 
rationale supported the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, thus providing legitimate 
arguments for the LGBT community and a means to continue pushing for the extension of 
marriage rights for same-sex couples. Following the decision, numerous states, including 
Hawaii, passed constitutional amendments proscribing same-sex marriage. Congress then passed 
the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as being between one man and one woman 
for federal purposes and allowed states to deny recognition to same-sex marriages performed in 
other states. Although these initiatives were either a result of public referenda or were enacted by 
duly elected bodies, it cannot be concluded that they reflected widespread public opinion on this 
issue. In fact, many argue that they did not mirror public preferences, but instead were a result of 
political countermobilization. Therefore, in order to adequately examine the relationship between 
public opinion and Court decisions, it is important to decipher between actual changes in public 
opinion following a decision and political backlash resulting from organized opposition.  
This study investigates whether Court decisions on culture war issues affect public 
opinion regarding these issues. Specifically, it examines the effect of Obergefell v. Hodges, 
which legalized same-sex marriage nationwide, on support for same-sex marriage. It seeks to 
measure whether this landmark decision affirmed existing opinion on the issue, whether the 
ruling pushed opinion forward, or whether backlash to Court involvement rolled back support for 
same-sex marriage. Changes among racial groups, religious groups, and parties are also included 
in this study in order to determine whether support from any of these groups is 
disproportionately affected by Court involvement. Changes in support for same-sex marriage in 
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the state of Kentucky are also measured. Because two of the consolidated cases in Obergefell v. 
Hodges came from Kentucky, studying changes in overall support in the state as well as changes 
among racial groups and parties further explains whether these decisions have a greater effect on 
the opinion of the individuals that are directly affected by them. National and state opinion polls 
taken before and after the landmark cases of U.S. v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry as well 
as other lower court rulings are utilized to determine if backlash to these cases is driving opinion 
on same-sex marriage. Changes following other significant events are also noted in order to 
account for the influence of other variables on changes in support for same-sex marriage. 
Previous research has investigated the effect of Court decisions on the advancement of social 
movements as well as the determinants of public support for LGBT rights. However, studying 
the effect of the Obergefell decision on national and state level opinion and measuring group 
behavior provides a nuanced perspective of the impact of Court involvement.  
Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage 
Court Involvement in the Culture War 
Primarily, most researchers that have studied whether the Supreme Court can initiate 
social reform conclude that its attempts are ineffective because they incite political backlash and 
do not alter public opinion. Rosenberg (1991) asserts that the Court can enforce previous 
decisions made by other branches and can make decisions consistent with those of the legislative 
and executive branches, but it cannot make lasting social change on its own. Researchers have 
concluded that, because the Court does not have the power to implement its decisions, these 
decisions lead to the passage of policies that undermine the spirit of the ruling (Rosenberg 1991; 
Blake 1977; Lewis and Seong Soo Oh 2008). Rosenberg (1991) argues that litigation is an 
ineffective strategy for social movements for this very reason. Although they may experience 
4 
 
initial success, this is limited by backlash following the decision. For example, following Roe v. 
Wade, anti-abortion proponents were elected, the Hyde Amendment was passed, and other anti-
abortion legislation was introduced.1 In regards to changes in public opinion, Rosenberg (1991) 
and Blake (1977) found no evidence that Court decisions have influenced public opinion, neither 
do they increase the salience of an issue. In fact, most citizens are not aware of Court decisions; 
therefore, any changes in opinion are not a result of a Supreme Court ruling (Rosenberg 1991; 
Blake 1977). These scholars find that Court intervention is counterproductive because it 
mobilizes the opposition, leading to attempts to overturn the decision, and does not change the 
public’s perception of an issue.  
Others have espoused similar views, concluding that most Court decisions do not affect 
opinion; however, when minute changes occur, they are often the result of other factors. Bishin 
(2015) found no change in opinion on same-sex marriage following the landmark decisions in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger and U.S. v. Windsor.  Bishin (2015) states that groups that are against 
same-sex marriage will continue to oppose it, while groups that support it will continue to do so, 
despite the opinion of judges. Some studies have found shifts in public opinion following Court 
decisions; however, scholars attribute these changes to other variables. Stoutenborough (2006) 
found that landmark decisions may cause shifts in public opinion, but other factors such as case-
by-case elements, media coverage and framing of a decision, as well as the political context of a 
decision influence public awareness and perception about a ruling. For example, in Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Court legalized homosexual sodomy, but public support for same-sex relations 
declined. Stoutenborough (2006) attributes that decline to the media’s negative depiction of the 
                                                          
1  The Hyde Amendment is a legislative provision that prohibits federal funding of abortions except in cases of rape, 
incest, or to save the life of the mother.  
5 
 
ruling, thus inferring that the media’s framing of a decision, not the actual decision, can cause 
changes in opinion. This suggests that, although most do not find shifts in opinion following a 
decision, when changes occur, they often result from other factors surrounding the decision and 
are not a direct consequence of the actual ruling.  
Some scholars, on the other hand, have concluded that Court involvement can be 
beneficial and can result in increases in public support. Keck (2009) argued that litigation 
benefited the LGBT community by putting gay rights on the agenda and empowering gay rights 
advocates. During the process of litigation, states expanded gay rights. They decriminalized 
sodomy, protected against hate crimes, prohibited employment discrimination, and provided 
some form of recognition to same-sex couples. Also, public support for gay rights continued to 
increase during this time. However, Keck also referenced the continued use of lobbying and 
public education throughout this process, thus suggesting that court decisions were not solely 
responsible for these gains. This study concludes that litigation in accordance with other 
variables can lead to the passage of pro-gay policies as well as an increase in public support for 
gay rights.  
Demographics and Same-Sex Marriage Policies 
Moreover, researchers have examined the effect of demographic variables on public 
support for gay rights. They often cite the influence of partisanship, ideology, exposure to the 
LGBT community, age, sex, and religious affiliation as factors contributing to individual 
opinion. Scholars studying individual opinion found that the most support for relationship 
recognition (i.e. civil unions, legal agreements, marriage) came from LGB individuals, 
Democrats, young adults, females, and the highly educated (Fleischmann and Moyer 2009; 
Flores 2014). Republicans and older adults, on the other hand, were more likely to oppose 
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recognition (Flores 2014; Olson et al 2006). In regards to religion, evangelicals were highly 
opposed to all forms of recognition, while Jews, Catholics, Non-Protestants, and the unaffiliated 
were less opposed to relationship recognition (Flores 2014; Fleischmann and Moyer 2009; Olson 
et al. 2006). These demographic variables have been tied to the passage of gay rights policies in 
state and local governments. Scholars studying public opinion on the local level found that 
districts with a large urban population are more likely to support relationship recognition rights, 
while conservative districts are less supportive of same-sex relationship recognition.  
In regards to state demographics, Olson et al. (2006) found that conservative states are more 
likely to support same-sex marriage bans, while liberal states are more likely to oppose them. 
States with a large Republican population or with a strong evangelical community are more 
likely support a ban, while states with mostly Democratic representation or with a large LGB 
population are likely to oppose a ban (Lewis and Seong Soo Oh 2008). These studies find that, 
because certain demographic groups are more supportive of relationship recognition, the 
demographic makeup of a state affects public support within that state, which then affects the 
policies that state passes.  
Public Opinion and Policies on Gay Rights 
Others have concluded that policies on LGBT rights may not reflect public support, but 
instead reflect organized interests. Barclay (2010) argued that most rulings of state and federal 
judges are in line with the expressed preferences of state legislatures and Congress, thus finding 
little support for President Bush’s statement that judges are acting outside the will of the people, 
communicated through their elected officials. However, some urge that the laws passed by 
elected officials do not reflect the will of the people. Lax and Phillips (2009) found that new laws 
and representation may be a result of political mobilization, not public opinion. Conservative 
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ideals are overrepresented because of powerful, Religious Right interest groups (Lax and Phillips 
2009). They found that policies on adoption, marriage, and sodomy are in line with public 
opinion (Lax and Phillips 2009). Policies on civil unions, jobs, housing, health, and hate crimes, 
on the other hand, are more conservative than the majority wants.  
However, although these policies may not reflect opinion, evidence has shown that they 
may influence opinion. Barclay and Flores (2014) found that the persistence of a law within a 
state affected public support for same-sex marriage. Each year the state maintained a ban, the 
more the public supported same-sex marriage (Barclay and Flores 2014). The laws of other states 
also swayed public opinion within a state. An increase in the number of states and, specifically, 
an increase in the number of neighboring states that allowed same-sex marriage caused an 
increase in public support within a state (Barclay and Flores 2014). These researchers conclude 
that public opinion shifts after the passage of a ban on same-sex marriage. Support increases the 
longer the ban is on the books and continues to increase as other states legalize same-sex 
marriage.  
Acquiescence with Court Decisions 
Furthermore, studies have also examined shifts in public opinion resulting from acquiescence 
with a Court ruling. Researchers have studied the impact of legitimacy on the public’s likelihood 
to accept a Supreme Court decision. Gibson (2012) argued that the public holds the Court in high 
esteem. Because the public believes that the Court bases its decision on legal reasoning rather 
than partisan considerations, citizens are more likely to accept its rulings, even if they disagree 
(Gibson 2012). Some, however, have argued that the residents of the city or state where the case 
arises from are more reluctant to accept the decision. After the Court ruled in Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free School District, residents in Center Moriches, New York were 
8 
 
more likely to maintain the same opinion they had before the ruling. In contrast, residents of 
Suffolk, New York, a neighboring city to Center Moriches, were more likely to defect to the 
opinion of the Court (Hoekstra and Segal 1996). Hoekstra and Segal (1996) argue that because 
the residents of Suffolk were not directly affected by the decision, they were more willing to 
accept it. Because residents of Center Moriches were directly affected by the ruling, they were 
reluctant to do so. This suggests that, although the Court is seen as legitimate by a vast majority 
of the public, when they are not directly affected, the public is more accepting of the Court’s 
decision. However, when they are directly affected, the public is more reluctant to accept a 
ruling. 
The Limited Reach of Obergefell 
Consistent with Bishin (2015) and Hoekstra and Segal (1996), I argue that the Obergefell 
ruling will not have an effect on national public support for same-sex-marriage. However, it will 
affect support on this issue in the state of Kentucky. I contend that national public support for 
same-sex marriage will continue to increase modestly following Obergefell. Gaps in support 
among whites and blacks will remain constant because the disparity between the races is due to 
differences in religion and religiosity, which will not be affected by the Obergefell ruling. As 
well, the gap between white evangelicals and white mainline Protestants will remain unchanged 
because variances between these groups are a result of differences in doctrine, which existed 
before the ruling, and will not be affected by the ruling. I assert that the gap between 
Republicans and Democrats on the national level will also remain constant because of the firm 
stances these parties have maintained on this issue. Partisan framing following the decision will 
not affect support among these parties because most members were likely exposed to these 
frames prior to the decision.  
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In Kentucky, I maintain that public support will be no higher after Obergefell than it was 
before. As a result, the gap between support from blacks and support from whites will also 
remain unchanged. I argue that the gap between support from Republicans and Democrats in 
Kentucky will increase because of partisan framing. Tea Party leaders will frame the decision as 
an overreach of power by the federal government, causing Republicans to resent the ruling and, 
consequently, same-sex marriage. On the other hand, left-leaning media outlets will frame the 
ruling as a decisive victory in the struggle for equality. This use of the equality frame will lead to 
an increase in support among Kentucky Democrats. Despite these changes in support among the 
parties, I argue that the majority of members from both parties will remain opposed to same-sex 
marriage because of Kentucky’s conservative, hyper-religious culture. Therefore, the gap 
between Republicans and Democrats in Kentucky will be smaller than that of the two national 
parties. 
Variables Influencing Support for Same-Sex Marriage  
 [Figure 2 here] 
National public support for same-sex marriage has reflected a positive, increasing trend over 
time (Flores 2014). As Figure 2 indicates, I argue that the variables influencing individual 
opinion regarding same-sex marriage include religion, exposure to the LGBT community, and 
media framing. Changes in these variables are responsible for increases in support for same-sex 
marriage. In regards to religion, the Christian share of the population has decreased over the last 
decade while the share of unaffiliated adults as well as the share of Non-Christian adults has 
increased steadily (Pew Research Center June 4- September 30, 2014).2 As Flores (2014) 
                                                          
2 The percentage of adults identifying as Christian dropped from 78.4% in 2007 to 70.6% in 2014. The percentage of 
unaffiliated adults increased from 16.1% to 22.8%. The percentage of Non-Christian adults has increased from 4.7% 
to 5.9%. 
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concluded, Non-Christians and the unaffiliated are more supportive of relationship recognition. I 
argue that changes in religious affiliation are partly responsible for the increase in nationwide 
support over time. Moreover, Lewis and Seong Soo Oh (2008) found that the larger the LGB 
community is within a state, the more support there is for relationship recognition. Consistent 
with their argument, I assert that more exposure to the LGBT community will lead to more 
support for same-sex marriage (Figure 2). In recent years, the number of adults that personally 
know a member of this community has increased (Pew Research May 1-5, 2013).3 I contend that 
the increase in number of people that have friendship of familial ties to LGBT individuals will 
lead to an increase in support for same-sex marriage. I also assert that changes in media framing 
of the LGBT community will lead to more support for same-sex marriage. Evidence has shown 
that media coverage of LGBT individuals as well as the gay rights movement has increased and, 
along with that increase, the media’s depiction of this group as well as the language employed to 
describe the movement has become more positive (Hackl et al. 2013; Steiner et al. 1993).  
I posit that these factors are responsible for increases in support for same-sex marriage. 
Changes in religion and exposure to the LGBT community occurred prior to Obergefell and will 
not be changed by the Court’s decision in Obergefell. Although Stoutenborough (2006) found 
that the media’s negative depiction of the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas led to a 
decrease in support for homosexual sodomy, the media focused on future implications of the 
ruling, not the actual ruling. Media outlets argued that it could lead to the legalization of same-
sex marriage, which led to a decrease in support for homosexual sodomy. Therefore, the actual 
ruling did not have an effect on opinion; its perceived effects, however, did (Engel 2013). I 
                                                          
3 The percentage of adults personally knowing someone that is gay or lesbian increased from 61% in 1993 to 87% in 
2013.  
11 
 
contend that this will not occur with the Obergefell decision because the ruling will be seen as 
the fulfillment of the ultimate goal of the gay rights movement, rather than a means to push for 
more rights. Therefore, this positive progression in support for same-sex marriage will be 
interrupted. Furthermore, because I attribute changes in support to the influence of other 
variables, and not Court decisions, the Obergefell ruling should not have an effect on opinion. 
Therefore, support for same-sex marriage should continue on its previous trend.  
H1: National public support for same-sex marriage will continue to increase modestly 
after Obergefell. 
The Effect of Race and Religiosity 
With respect to race, I argue that the influence of religion and religiosity will account for the 
gap between whites and blacks. Because the variable causing this disparity is unrelated to Court 
decisions, I maintain that the gap between the races will remain unchanged following Obergefell.  
I expect blacks will have the lowest support for same-sex marriage because of the group’s strong, 
religious ties. Whites have proven to have looser ties to religion, and thus should be more 
accepting of the LGBT community (Gallup Daily tracking survey Religiousness by Race and 
Ethnic Groups January-May 2011). In regards to support among Latinos, I do not have clear 
directional expectations because of conflicting indicators. Although the majority of Latinos say 
that their religious beliefs are an important part of their life, the majority also believe 
homosexuality should be accepted by society (Pew Hispanic Center 2012). Despite this conflict, 
nothing suggests that the racial gap in opinion before Obergefell will be changed by the decision 
in Obergefell. Variables affecting support among blacks, whites, and Latinos are unrelated to 
Court decisions. Therefore, I argue that gaps in support between the races will not change 
following the ruling. 
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H2: The gap in national public support among whites, blacks, and Latinos will remain 
unchanged following Obergefell. 
Religion and Support for Same-Sex Marriage 
In regards to religion, I expect public support among white mainline Protestants to be greater 
than that of white evangelicals because of differences in doctrine. Most white mainline 
denominations now teach a doctrine of inclusion, with many allowing same-sex couples to marry 
in the church in recent years (United Church of Christ, Episcopal Church, Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.)). In contrast, most evangelicals holdfast to the belief that marriage is a sacred union 
meant only to be between a man and a woman. In this case as well, I argue that the factors 
influencing opinion are outside of the realm of the Court. Recent changes in the doctrine of white 
mainline Protestants occurred prior to Obergefell, suggesting that changes in the gap between 
white evangelicals and white mainline Protestants occurred prior to the ruling. If this is the case, 
the gap should remain unchanged in national data following the 2015 ruling. 
H3: The gap between support from white evangelicals and support from white mainline 
Protestants will remain unchanged following Obergefell. 
Partisan Differences in Support for Same-Sex Marriage 
In addition, I expect the gap in support between the national parties to remain constant 
following Obergefell. Both parties have maintained firm stances on this issue, with most 
Republicans opposed and most Democrats supportive. Leaders in the Republican Party will 
frame the ruling as judicial lawmaking and as a direct attack on religious liberty. Left-leaning 
media outlets will frame the ruling as an affirmation of the constitutional rights once denied to 
same-sex couples, yet granted to heterosexual couples. However, I posit that framing will not 
affect members on the national level because most members were already exposed to these 
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frames before the decision. Unlike what I expect to see on the state level, I argue that most 
members of the national parties will not be exposed to the state sovereignty frame, seeing that 37 
states already legalized same-sex marriage before Obergefell. In view of the fact that party 
members have likely consumed information utilizing the judicial activism frame, the religious 
liberty frame, and the equality frame prior to Obergefell, I argue that the ruling will only affirm 
previously held attitudes toward same-sex marriage.  
H4: The gap between support from Republicans and support from Democrats will remain 
unchanged following Obergefell.  
Kentucky Exceptionalism  
In contrast to the expected increase in support on the national level, I expect support in 
Kentucky to be no higher after Obergefell than it was before. Hoekstra and Segal (1996) found 
that the residents of the city or state that the case arises from are more likely to reject a decision 
because they are directly affected by it. In Kentucky, the Obergefell decision overturned a 
constitutional amendment. Therefore, I argue that the decision will be perceived as an 
infringement upon states’ rights and will undermine any prospective progress in opinion. As 
Rosenberg (1991) asserted, Court involvement in the culture war often leads to stagnation in the 
public’s progression on an issue. In the case of same-sex marriage, I do not expect this be true on 
the national level because the majority of Americans supported allowing gays and lesbians to 
marry prior to Obergefell. However, given the conservative, religious culture that is unique to 
southern states as well as the existing pushback against same-sex marriage, I posit that Court 
involvement will impede any gains for the LGBT community in the state of Kentucky. State 
estimates for Kentucky opinion suggest that support for same-sex marriage has reflected an 
increasing trend over time (Gelman et al. 2010). I argue that this trend will be interrupted by the 
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Obergefell ruling. Although support for same-sex marriage has increased slowly in the state, I 
contend that the decision will halt progression in Kentucky. In regards to race, as seen on the 
national level, I assert that differences in religiosity between blacks and whites will lead to 
greater support for same-sex marriage among whites. Again, because these variables are outside 
of the realm of the Court, the gap between races will remain constant after the decision.  
H5: Public support for same-sex marriage in Kentucky will be no higher after Obergefell 
than it was before. 
H6: The gap between support from blacks and support from whites in Kentucky will 
remain unchanged following Obergefell. 
The Effects of Partisan Framing 
Thus far, my hypotheses have predicted that the Court ruling in Obergefell will not have a 
measurable impact.  However, there is one subgroup for whom I do expect to see a difference. 
Among Republicans and Democrats, I argue that the gap in support will increase following 
Obergefell due to partisan framing. Republicans in the state will not only view the decision as 
judicial lawmaking as well as a threat to religious liberty, but will also see it as direct attack on 
state sovereignty because of partisan framing by Tea Party leaders in the state. The state 
sovereignty frame has been used by Tea Party members in the past in attempts to overturn 
Windsor. Representative Weber (R-TX) introduced the State Marriage Defense Act of 2014 in 
the House, which was cosponsored by Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY), and was introduced in the 
Senate by Senator Ted Cruz. It sought to force the federal government to defer to the state’s 
definition of marriage when applying federal laws. This bill was reintroduced by Cruz before the 
Court announced its decision in Obergefell. I expect these leaders to continue to use this frame 
following Obergefell. I argue that it will appeal to Kentucky Republicans because the Tea Party 
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has a strong presence in the state. Several Tea Party members, who have faced establishment-
backed candidates in their respective primaries (Gov. Matt Bevin, Sen. Rand Paul, Rep. Thomas 
Massie) were elected. This suggests that the Tea Party movement has gained a significant 
following in Kentucky and, therefore, framing by its leaders will disproportionately affect 
Republicans in state. Moreover, I argue that the use of the equality frame will cause an increase 
in support among some skeptical Democrats. Most Democrats in Kentucky are socially 
conservative; however, because Democrats are usually more egalitarian than Republicans, the 
use of the equality frame following the ruling will appeal to them (Gelman 2009; Wildavsky and 
Dake 1990). This will lead to an increase in support among Democrats in Kentucky. As a result 
of these factors, I contend the gap between support from Democrats and Republicans will 
increase following the ruling.  
H7: The gap between support from Republicans and support from Democrats in 
Kentucky will increase following Obergefell. 
In regards to party differences on this issue, support among Republicans and Democrats in 
Kentucky will vary slightly. Despite expected changes in support explained above, I still expect 
the gap between the national Republican Party and the national Democratic Party to be wider 
than that of the state parties. Although more Democrats will support same-sex marriage, I argue 
that the majority will remain opposed to it. Recent elections support this assumption. Although 
most registered voters are Democrats, Kentucky consistently votes for Republican presidential 
candidates.4 Also, Republicans enjoyed a sweeping victory in the 2015 general election and, 
even Democratic Party leaders in Kentucky often maintain conservative views on marriage. For 
                                                          
4 VOTER REGISTRATION STATISTICS REPORT       
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example, former Democratic Governor Steve Beshear was the defendant for the two cases arising 
from Kentucky. These examples suggest that Kentucky Democrats are different from the 
national party. Therefore, although I expect the gap between the parties to widen following the 
ruling, because the majority in both parties will remain opposed to same-sex marriage, this gap 
will remain smaller than that of the national parties.  
H8: The gap between support from Republicans and Democrats in Kentucky will be 
smaller than the gap between Republicans and Democrats on the national level before 
and after Obergefell.  
Measuring Support for Same-Sex Marriage 
Numerous polls have been conducted in order to measure public opinion on the issue of 
same-sex marriage. However, variations in the question wording, answer choices, and 
methodologies used in these polls can skew results. These “house effects” can lead to erroneous 
conclusions about public evolution on this issue. They can also affect findings on the influence 
of the Obergefell ruling on public opinion regarding same-sex marriage. Therefore, differences 
in the methodologies utilized in the surveys from the Pew Research Center, the Bluegrass Poll, 
and the Williams Institute, that are used in this study, are important to highlight.5  
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 displays the dates, methodologies, number of respondents, question wording, 
answer choices, and margins of error of the surveys from the Pew Research Center and Bluegrass 
Poll. 
National Opinion Data 
                                                          
5 Thank you to the Pew Research Center and the Williams Institute for providing the raw data for this study. 
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Changes in nationwide support for same-sex marriage following Obergefell are measured 
using data from the Pew Research Center. Pew surveys adults ages 18 and older living in all 50 
states.6 It utilizes responses from both landlines and cell phones, and numbers are chosen using 
random digit dialing.7 Results are weighted to match the national demographics of gender, age, 
race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, population density, phone status (matching the 
percentage of people in the U.S. with only a landline, only a cellphone, or both), and relative 
usage of landlines and cell phones (for those with both).8  
This study employs data from two surveys conducted by Pew prior to U.S. v. Windsor 
and Hollingsworth v. Perry (March 13-17, 2013; May 1-5, 2013) and two surveys following 
Windsor and Perry (February 12-26, 2014; September 2-9, 2014). It also includes one survey 
before and one survey after Obergefell v. Hodges (May 12-18, 2015; July 14-20, 2015). 
Respondents in each of the surveys were asked about their opinion regarding same-sex marriage. 
One limitation to the use of this data is that some participants refused to answer, thus skewing 
nationwide results on support and opposition to same-sex marriage. Also, the question 
respondents were asked does not describe the conditions of marriage for same-sex couples. 
Therefore, those that support allowing gays and lesbians to marry, but withholding some of the 
benefits of heterosexual marriage (i.e. supporters of civil unions or legal agreements) may be 
absorbed in the group of supporters of same-sex marriage.    
Kentucky Opinion Data 
                                                          
6 Respondents from the February 2015 survey were from the continental U.S. 
7 Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. Landline respondents are chosen by asking for the youngest 
adult male or female who is now at home. Cell phone interviews are conducted with the person who answered the 
phone. 
8 Demographics are based on data from Census Bureau’s American Community Survey and population density is 
based on data from the Decennial Census. Phone status is based on data from the National Health Survey. 
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Changes in support in Kentucky are measured using data from the Bluegrass Poll, while 
state estimates from the Williams Institute are used to examine trends in support over time. 
Similar to Pew, surveys from the Bluegrass Poll include cellphone and home phone respondents 
and households are selected using random digit dialing. Also, responses are weighted for age, 
gender, ethnic origin and region.9 However, unlike surveys from Pew, home phone respondents 
are interviewed by a recorded voice, while cellphone respondents are shown a questionnaire on 
their smartphone, tablet or other electronic device.  
This study utilizes surveys taken from January 30-February 4, 2014, July 18- July 23, 
2014, March 3-8, 2015 (before Obergefell) and from July 22-28, 2015 (after Obergefell). With 
the exception of the July 2015 survey, participants in these surveys gave their opinion regarding 
same-sex marriage in Kentucky. In the July 2015 survey, respondents were not asked if they 
favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry. They were asked if they agree or disagree 
with the ruling. This difference in question wording following Obergefell presents a problem for 
this study. The main objective of this project was to test changes in public support for same-sex 
marriage following Obergefell. Because respondents were not asked if they favor or oppose 
allowing gays and lesbians to marry following the ruling, I cannot test my hypotheses regarding 
changes in overall support as well as changes in the gaps in support between blacks and whites 
and Republicans and Democrats in the state.  
Moreover, the language used in the question from the July 2015 survey could lead to 
erroneous conclusions about opinion regarding the decision among Kentucky residents. Most 
LGBT allies now use the term “equal marriage.” “Gay marriage” is usually used among circles 
that oppose extending marriage rights to the LGBT community. The use of this language could 
                                                          
9 U.S. Census data were employed for demographics 
19 
 
lead to an overestimation of opposition among Kentuckians. Also, respondents in all of the 
surveys from the Bluegrass Poll were allowed to answer “not sure.” Again, this allows 
participants to opt out of sharing their opinion, thus skewing reported results for opinion in 
Kentucky.  
Unlike the data from the Bluegrass Poll, the data from the Williams Institute are state 
estimates extracted from national polls. National polls were aggregated to create a megapoll and 
a statistical procedure was employed to decompose the megapoll into state estimates. A 
regression model was used to estimate how demographic variables affect the likelihood someone 
supports same-sex marriage. Demographic variables include: age (18-29, 30-44, 45-64, 65+), sex 
(male and female), race (black and all others), and education (Less than H.S. diploma, H.S. 
diploma, some college, and college graduate). The results were then post-stratified to match the 
demographics (age, race, sex, and education) of Kentucky.10 The likelihood a person supports 
same-sex marriage was estimated and then the Census data were used to determine how many 
people in each state fit that demographic profile. The number of supporters in each state was 
summed up and divided by the total number of people in that state to find the percentage of 
people in each state that are supportive of same-sex marriage. The only limitation of these data is 
that they are yearly, aggregate estimates. Therefore, the data cannot be used to examine changes 
in opinion before and after Obergefell. However, the data can be used as a robustness test in 
order to assess the accuracy of the data from the Bluegrass Poll and to examine the trend in 
support for same-sex marriage in Kentucky over time. 
Variables 
                                                          
10 U.S. Census data were employed for demographics 
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Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables included in this study are national public support for same-sex 
marriage as well support for same-sex marriage in the state of Kentucky. National public support 
is observed by measuring changes in the percentage of respondents that answered in favor of 
same-sex marriage in opinion polls taken by the Pew Research Center. Public support in the state 
of Kentucky is assessed by measuring changes in the percentage of respondents that answered in 
favor of same-sex marriage in opinion polls taken by the Bluegrass Poll as well changes in 
estimates made by the Williams Institute.  
Independent Variables  
Independent variables affecting support on the national level include time, race, religion, 
and partisanship. The influence of time is measured using polls conducted from March 2013 to 
July 2015 (prior to Windsor and Perry and following Obergefell), in order to observe whether 
these cases as well as other significant events affected support. Changes in the gap in support 
between white mainline Protestants and white evangelicals account for the effect of religion. The 
effect of race is measured by observing changes in the gap in support between blacks, whites, 
and Latinos. Changes in the gap in support between Republicans and Democrats are used to 
measure the impact of partisanship. The influence of time on the state level is measured using 
polls conducted from February 2014 to July 2015, in order to observe changes in support in 
relation to significant events leading up to and following the Obergefell decision. The effects of 
race and partisanship are also measured on the state level by noting changes in the gaps in 
support between whites and blacks and Republicans and Democrats. 
The Dependency of Court Influence 
 [Figure 2 here] 
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Figure 2 details significant events leading up to Obergefell v. Hodges. It provides a 
context for the ruling and illustrates the current political climate surrounding Obergefell. Figure 
2 includes events leading up to the decision that may have also contributed to changes in support 
for same-sex marriage. Events include Supreme Court decisions, lower court decisions, and state 
recognitions of same-sex marriages. Figure 2 also tracks the two cases from Kentucky in order to 
measure changes in Kentucky opinion following lower court decisions as well as changes 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.  
Minimal Effect on Support 
[Figure 3 here] 
Before examining the impact of the Obergefell case, it is instructive to look at national 
public opinion before and after the two earlier Supreme Court marriage decisions. Figure 3 
shows an increase in support from March 2013 to May 2013 and from May 2013 to February 
2014; however, these data points are not statistically significant from one another. As seen in 
Figure 3, the error bars for these two data points overlap; therefore, they cannot be said to be 
statistically different from one another. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that opinion changed. 
However, it can be concluded that a significant increase in support occurred between March 
2013 and February 2014. As seen in Figure 2, during this time the Supreme Court struck down 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act in U.S. v. Windsor. It also declared proponents of 
Proposition 8 did not have standing in Hollingsworth v. Perry. This allowed the appellate court’s 
decision to stand, which struck down California’s constitutional amendment proscribing same-
sex marriage. Also, during this period, same-sex marriage was legalized in Rhode Island, 
Delaware, Minnesota, New Jersey, Hawaii, and Illinois (Figure 2). Despite positive changes in 
support, it cannot be concluded that the decisions of the Court were solely responsible. This time 
22 
 
frame left room for the influence of other variables (exposure to the LGBT community, changes 
in religion and religiosity, state decisions on this issue, etc.) to influence support for same-sex 
marriage. 
Figure 3 also shows a decrease in support from February 2014 to September 2014. As 
Figure 2 indicates, during this time period, same-sex marriage was legalized in Oregon and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th, 4th, and 7th Circuits ruled in favor of extending marriage 
rights to same-sex couples. However, support reported from the September 2014 survey could be 
underestimated. While the percentage of respondents who answered favorably decreased, the 
percentage of participants who refused to respond increased. Also, other polls 
conducted around this time either reported that opinion remained unchanged or decreased 
slightly, suggesting that these court decisions had a limited effect, if any.11  
Support also increased between September 2014 and May 2015; during which time the 
Supreme Court decided not to review the cases from the appellate courts, which had the practical 
effect of legalizing marriage in these circuits (Figure 2). Also, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
9th Circuit ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in cases from Idaho and Nevada and the 6th 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld same-sex marriage bans. The Supreme Court then granted 
certiorari to review the 6th Circuit cases (Figure 2). Again, despite positive changes in support, 
suspicion of the accuracy of the September 2014 poll will also affect conclusions made about 
increases in support from September 2014 to May 2015. Other polls reported small increases in 
support, suggesting that judicial action may have had a slight effect on opinion (CBS News/New 
York Times Poll September 12-15, 2014; April 30, 2015- May 3, 2015). However, in this case as 
                                                          
11 (CBS News/New York Times Poll February 19-23, 2014, September 12-15, 2014; ABC News/Washington Post 
Poll. October 9-12, 2014, ABC News/Washington Post Poll. February 27-March 2, 2014; Public Religion Research 
Institute January 2014, September 2014) 
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well, other variables could have affected shifts in support. According to Figure 3, support 
decreased from May 2015 to July 2015. This decrease in support followed the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.  However, as their overlapping error bas indicate, these data 
points are not statistically significant. As a result, it cannot be concluded that support decreased 
and, therefore, Hypothesis 1 can neither be accepted nor rejected.  
The Influence of Attitudes Toward the Court System 
[Figure 4 here] 
In regards to race, gaps in support between the races remained constant before and after 
the ruling, supporting my hypothesis that other factors contribute to this continuous disparity. 
Figure 4 shows an increase in the gap between white respondents and black respondents from 
March 2013 to May 2013. This gap remained constant until May 2015. From May 2015 to July 
2015, this gap remained unchanged, thus providing support for Hypothesis 2. As I previously 
argued, Court rulings did not change differences between the races. However, this disparity 
increases as Court decisions approach. This gap increased from March 2013 to May 2013, 
preceding Windsor and Perry, and from September 2014 to March 2015, prior to Obergefell. 
Again, however, support may be underestimated because of the possible inaccuracy of the 
September poll.  
Nonetheless, if these changes exist prior to a landmark decision, this may be a result of 
attitudinal differences in regards to the justice system. As Gibson (2012) contended, the public 
holds the Court in high esteem; however, most blacks express discontent with the courts, often 
feeling marginalized by them. As a landmark Supreme Court case approaches, support from 
blacks decreases slightly while support from whites increases. Following the decisions, however, 
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gaps in support remained constant, justifying my argument that other variables, such as 
differences in religion and religiosity, account for the gap in support between the races.  
Furthermore, the percentage of Latino respondents that answered favorably when asked 
about same-sex marriage before and after Obergefell was greater than that of blacks, but less 
than that of whites. These data reflect the conflicting variables previously mentioned. Although 
the majority of Latino respondents are devout Catholics, the majority also accept homosexuality, 
suggesting that Latinos have to reconcile these contradictory views. Although some Latinos may 
accept homosexuality, they may reject extending marriage rights to homosexual couples. 
Following the decision, the percentage of Latinos that supported same-sex marriage decreased 
from 56% to 55% (Pew Research Center May 12-18, 2015; July 14-20, 2015). Again, in this 
case, the gap in support between Latinos and whites and Latinos and blacks remained constant, 
further affirming my argument that differences are due to other variables, such as religion and 
religiosity. 
The Effect of Partisanship on Religious Groups 
 [Figure 5 here] 
As seen among racial groups, changes in opinion among religious groups occur prior to 
landmark decisions. Figure 5 indicates a large spike in support from white maimline Preotestants 
prior to these decisions. Although support among this group may have increased during this time, 
this spike could have been attributed to other factors. For example, the sample of white mainline 
Protestants in the March 2013 survey consisted of mostly Republicans, suggesting that support 
from this group was underestimated.  
Figure 5 then shows an increase in the gap following the legalization of same-sex 
marriage in Oregon and the rulings of the 10th, 4th, and 7th Circuits. As support grows among 
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white mainline Protestants, support mostly remains flat among white evangelicals. Support then 
decreased from February 2014 to September 2014, and increased from September 2014 to May 
2015. The September poll may have skewed these results as well. As seen among overall 
opinion, support likely remained constant during this time, suggesting that lower court decisions 
as well as Oregon’s legalization likely did not have an effect on support from these religious 
groups. According to Figure 5, the gap in support decreased following Obergefell. However, the 
majority of white mainline Protestants surveyed in July 2015 were Republicans; therefore, 
support among this group may have been miscalculated.  
Notnetheless, following Obergefell, the gap in support between the two groups likely still 
decreased, but it may not have decreased as much as Figure 5 indicates. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 
can be rejected. However, these data support my contention that white mainline Protestants will 
be more supportive of same-sex marriage. Even when support among this group hit new lows, it 
still remained well above that of white evangelicals, suggesting that other variables such as 
differences in doctrine account for this continuous gap between white mainline Protestants and 
white evangelicals. These data also suggest that partisanship may be a better indicator of support 
for same-sex marriage. The majority of respondents in the March 2013 and July 2015 surveys 
were Republicans. The opposition of Republicans drove down support from white mainline 
Protestants. This suggests that Republicans that belong to mainline denomiations remain socially 
conservative. Therefore, an individual’s party identification may be a better indicator of their 
support for same-sex marriage than their religious affiliation.    
Reactions of Party Members 
[Figure 6 here] 
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According to Figure 6, the gap in support between Democrats and Republicans decreased 
from March 2013 to May 2013, prior to U.S. v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry and 
following the legalization of same-sex marriage in Rhode Island. The gap then increased 
between May 2013 and February 2014, during which time same-sex marriage was legalized in 
Delaware, Minnesota, New Jersey, Hawaii, and Illinois (Figure 2). Support from Democrats 
increased while support from Republicans mostly remained flat, intimating that, with the 
exception of Rhode Island, state recognition disproportionately affects Democrats. As more 
states extend marriage rights to same-sex couples, more Democrats support same-sex marriage.  
Figure 6 also shows a decrease between February 2014 and September 2014; and an 
increase from September 2014 and May 2015. However, because of the possible inaccuracy of 
the September poll, as seen in overall opinion, support from both groups likely remained 
constant, suggesting that the actions of the lower courts as well as those of the Supreme Court 
during this time did not influence support for same-sex marriage. According to Figure 6, the gap 
between the parties increased between May 2015 and July 2015, immediately following 
Obergefell; therefore, Hypothesis 4 can be rejected. Support from Republicans decreased while 
support from Democrats increased following the Court’s decision in Obergefell. A possible 
explanation for the behavior of Republicans and Democrats following the ruling could be the 
influence of partisan framing. Although I previously argued framing would not affect support 
among Republicans and Democrats on the national level, I did not consider how much 
information party members consume. If respondents are low information voters, they may not 
have been exposed to partisan frames prior to Obergefell. Therefore, exposure to these frames 
following this highly salient case could account for changes in support.  
Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Kentucky 
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[Figure 7 here] 
As seen on the national level, state data provide inconclusive evidence on changes in 
support in Kentucky following Obergefell. The Bluegrass Poll reported an increase in support for 
same-sex marriage from February 2014 to July 2014, coinciding with Attorney General Jack 
Conway’s refusal to continue defending the state’s same-sex marriage ban (Figure 2). Also, 
according to Figure 2, District Court Judge Heyburn ruled that Kentucky must recognize same-
sex marriages from other states (Bourke v. Beshear) and that Kentucky's ban on same-sex 
marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause (Love v. Beshear), Bluegrass reported a decrease 
in support for same-sex marriage from July 2014 to March 2015. During this time, the 6th Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld same-sex marriage bans and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review of all the 6th Circuit cases (Figure 2). However, as Figure 2 indicates, these data points 
are not statistically significant from one another; therefore, it cannot be concluded that these 
factors led to a change in support in Kentucky.  
Hypothesis 5 cannot be tested using the data from the Bluegrass Poll because of 
differences in question wording following Obergefell. Respondents in the pre-Obergefell survey 
(March 2015) were asked if they favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry in 
Kentucky. However, respondents in the post-Obergefell survey (July 2015) were asked if they 
agree or disagree with the decision. Therefore, I cannot measure changes in support for same-sex 
marriage. When asked about Obergefell, thirty-eight percent of respondents agreed with the 
decision. Although the majority of those who answered favorably are likely supporters of same-
sex marriage, public support for same-sex marriage may be lower or higher than 38%. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 5 can neither be accepted nor rejected because of the flawed question wording in the 
post-Obergefell poll.  
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However, through estimates from the Williams Institute, conclusions can be drawn about 
changes in opinion in Kentucky over time.  Figure 8 shows significant increases in support from 
2000 to 2008, 2008 to 2011, and 2011 to 2014.  Although Bluegrass reported less support than 
the estimates of the Williams Institute, these estimates suggest that although opinion has been 
changing more rapidly, it takes at least three years for significant changes to occur. Therefore, it 
can be inferred that a Court decision in 2015, a year after the last significant increase, would not 
change this trend in a significant way. 
Moreover, following the decision, three county clerks refused to issue marriage licenses, 
citing their religious beliefs. One of these clerks, Rowan County’s Kim Davis, gained national 
attention after continuing to refuse to issue licenses despite several court orders to do so 
following a lawsuit from the ACLU. After Davis was found in contempt of Court, jailed, and 
released, respondents were asked if she should be required to issue the licenses. Fifty-one percent 
answered that she should be required (Bluegrass September 22-27, 2015). Following Obergefell, 
the vast majority of respondents answered that they disagree with the decision. However, 
following Davis’s continued refusal to comply and the media’s negative portrayal of her 
noncompliance, most agreed that she should have to comply. This suggests that although most 
Kentuckians oppose same-sex marriage and oppose the Obergefell ruling, they are willing to 
acquiesce. Noncompliance by state officials is seen as defiant. Although most Kentuckians 
maintain similar beliefs to those of Kim Davis, they respect the Court’s decision and believe 
those charged with the duty to carry out the law should do so despite their religious convictions.  
This case opposes the view posited by Hoekstra and Segal (1991). Despite being directly 
affected by the decision, the reaction of Kentucky residents to Kim Davis’s noncompliance 
shows that they are willing to acquiesce. However, after the Republican victory in the 2015 
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election, legislators proposed bills and Governor Matt Bevin issued an executive order aimed at 
protecting clerks who argue that their religious beliefs prevent them from issuing licenses to 
same-sex couples.12 In view of the fact that most Kentuckians believe Davis should be required 
to issue licenses to same-sex couples, these initiatives are likely reflective of political 
countermobilization, not public opinion, thus providing support for Lax and Phillips’s (2009) 
argument. 
Race and Resistance to Court Involvement    
[Figure 8 here] 
Moreover, Kentucky data for whites and blacks also provides some support for the 
impact of attitudinal differences between the races in regards to the justice system. After district 
court decisions in Bourke v. Beshear and Love v. Beshear (Figure 2), support among blacks in 
Kentucky decreased while support among whites in Kentucky increased (Figure 8), thus 
providing support for previous claims about discontent with the courts among blacks. However, 
unlike the previous trend, actions of the appellate court and the Supreme Court between July 
2014 and March 2015 (Figure 2) led to an increase in support from blacks and a decrease in 
support from whites (Figure 8). As well, changes in the gap in support following Obergefell 
cannot be examined because of the July 2015 question wording. Obergefell. Of all white 
respondents 38% agreed with the decisions. Of all black respondents, 20% answered agreed with 
                                                          
12 Gov. Bevin’s executive order removes the name of counties and county clerks from marriage licenses. The new 
license lists at the top of the form only the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not the county or the county clerk and 
allows an issuing official to sign Chieves 2015) The Kentucky Senate passed a bill creating a two marriage license 
forms, one for same-sex couples and one for heterosexual couples. One marriage license would designate the 
“bride” and “groom” and the other would designate “first party” and “second party.” The names with the names of 
the county clerk and deputy clerk removed from both forms (Brammer 2016). The Kentucky House passed a bill that 
would create a single-form license that allows marriage license applicants to check "bride," ''groom" or "spouse" 
beside their name. Names of county clerk are still not included on this form. Bevin has come out in favor of this bill 
(Schreiner 2016). 
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the decisions Again, these numbers do not reflect support for same-sex marriage from whites and 
blacks because those that agree with the Court’s reasoning are absorbed in this group; therefore, 
Hypothesis 6 can neither be accepted nor rejected.     
However, these data provide support for the assertion that blacks are resistance to Court 
involvement. Although blacks in Kentucky are more supportive of same-sex marriage prior to 
Obergefell, this support is not reflected in their opinion of the Supreme Court’s decision. Despite 
negative feelings toward the courts, the majority of black respondents stated that Kim Davis 
should be required to issue the licenses. Fifty-eight percent of blacks answered that she should be 
required to issue the licenses compared to fifty percent of whites (Bluegrass Poll September 22-
27, 2015). Although they disagreed with the decision, blacks in Kentucky agreed that it should 
be carried out. This may be because of a connection to their history, seeing that this case may be 
reminiscent of backlash they experienced following landmark cases, such as Brown v. Board of 
Education and Loving v. Virginia.13 
Party Registration/Affiliation and Obergefell Aftermath 
[Table 2 here] 
Furthermore, the data support my hypothesis that the gap in support between the national 
parties will be larger than that of the state parties. Table 2 shows the influence of party 
registration on a person’s likelihood to support same-sex marriage. Again, the effect of the 
                                                          
13 Following Brown, schools in southern states closed in order to avoid desegregation. States passed freedom of 
choice" laws, giving parents the ability to determine which schools their children. White parents chose white 
schools. Black parents chose black schools in order to protect their children from the violence and intimidation 
resulting from attending a white school (Ball 2006). States also cut off funding for schools under desegregation 
orders. States also adopted pupil placement laws in order to use criteria, such as aptitude, psychological fitness, and 
health, to make school assignment decisions and thus remain segregated. Ten years after Brown II, only 1 percent of 
black students attended a school with white students (Ball 2006). Following Loving v. Virginia, an interracial couple 
was denied a marriage license (U.S. v. Brittain). Following this decision, most holdout states relented. However anti-
miscegenation laws were still on the books in many states. South Carolina and Alabama did not revoke their laws 
until 1999 and 20000. In 2009, a Louisiana justice of the peace refused to issue a license to an interracial couple, 
citing concern about the upbringing of the couple’s future children (Huffington Post 2009).  
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Obergefell decision on support for same-sex marriage cannot be measured because of the 
question wording of the post-Obergefell survey. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 cannot be tested using 
this data. However, the March 2015 survey provides some justification for Hypothesis 8. 
Nineteen percent of Republicans and forty-three percent of Democrats in Kentucky support 
same-sex marriage, compared to thirty-four percent of Republicans and sixty-five percent of 
Democrats nationwide (Pew Research Center May 12-18, 2015), thus confirming that the gap in 
support between the parties is larger on the national level. These data support the assertion that 
political parties in Kentucky are inherently different than the national parties. Even regarding an 
issue that has incited a culture war on the national level, there is large consensus among party 
members in the state, supporting the notion of Kentucky exceptionalism. Although there is a 
disparity between Kentucky Republicans and Kentucky Democrats, the majority in both parties 
oppose same-sex marriage, suggesting that the culture of the state caused groups that are often on 
opposing sides of an issue to view this particular issue in the same way.   
Although these data cannot be used to determine whether Obergefell influenced support 
for same-sex marriage, the data can be used to examine the behavior of party members and party 
affiliates, thus providing a nuanced explanation of party dynamics. Most groups in this survey 
behave similarly; more respondents agreed with the decision than supported same-sex marriage 
and even more believed Davis should be required to issue the licenses (Table 2). However, 
despite opposition to same-sex marriage and disapproval of the Obergefell ruling, some groups 
overwhelmingly believed Davis should be required to issue the licenses (registered Democrats, 
Independents leaning Democrat, Democratic affiliates).The behavior of other groups did not 
follow this common pattern, with more respondents supporting same-sex marriage than agreeing 
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with the decision and even more believing Davis should be required to issue the licenses (Strong 
Republicans, Independents). 
Among registered Democrats and Democratic affiliates, the majority opposed same-sex 
marriage and the majority disagreed with the Obergefell ruling; however, most believed Kim 
Davis should be required to issue the licenses (Table 2). This may be due to partisan framing of 
Davis’s actions. These respondents likely consumed information from left-leaning media outlets, 
which depicted her as a defiant, religious bigot, evading her constitutional duty. Also, these 
respondents may have condemned her refusal to obey orders given by her own party.14 Not only 
did she defy several court orders, but Davis refused to comply with Governor Beshear’s 
directive, which ordered all Kentucky county clerks to authorize licenses to same-sex couples; 
she later sued Beshear for not protecting her religious liberty. These factors may have informed 
attitudes toward Davis among Democratic party members and Democratic affiliates, thus causing 
these groups to overwhelmingly oppose her actions, despite disapproval of same-sex marriage 
and the Obergefell ruling. 
Among Strong Republicans, the vast majority opposed same-sex marriage and disagreed 
with the decision; however, more favored same-sex marriage than agreed with the ruling (Table 
2). This suggests that some Strong Republicans may accept same-sex marriage, but condemn 
Court mandated same-sex marriage. In view of the fact that conservatives often champion 
limited federal government, this group may have agreed with the policy, but not the process. 
Because the Court legalized same-sex marriage rather than the states, they reject the decision. 
These data support my argument regarding Tea Party framing. Although I expected the state 
sovereignty frame to affect all Republicans in the state, resistance to intervention by the federal 
                                                          
14 Davis later joined the GOP. 
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government may have only influenced attitudes toward Obergefell among those who identify as 
Strong Republicans. Because registered Republicans, Republican affiliates, and Independents 
leaning Republican followed the trend seen by most other groups (more agreed with the decision 
than supported same-sex marriage and even more believed Davis should be required to issue the 
licenses) resistance to federal intervention seems to only affect the most conservative.  
Table 2 also shows the volatility of the opinion of Independents; the majority opposed 
same-sex marriage, and an even larger percentage disagreed with Obergefell, yet the majority 
believed Kim Davis should be required to issue the licenses. The fact that Independents are often 
low information voters could explain this volatility (Magleby 2011). These respondents were 
likely more susceptible to partisan framing and thus may have viewed the decision as 
constituting judicial overreach. Also, because they are often uninformed, these respondents may 
have been unaware of the previous cases and events on the national and state level leading up to 
Obergefell and, therefore, were resistant to the sweeping change it imposed on Kentucky. 
Independents leaning Democrat were disproportionately more likely to agree with the decision 
than they were to support same-sex marriage, compared to registered Democrats and Democratic 
affiliates (Table 2). This may be due to partisan framing as well. These individuals likely 
consumed information praising Obergefell as a groundbreaking, civil rights victory for the 
LGBT community, which could have informed attitudes toward the decision.  
However, despite variations among these groups, acceptance of the decision as well as 
reactions to Kim Davis among all of the groups suggests that party members and affiliates are 
willing to accept a decision even if they disapprove of same-sex marriage. Among most groups, 
more respondents agreed with decision compared to the amount that support same-sex marriage, 
and, even more reject Davis’s actions This pattern suggests that most are not just willing to 
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accept the decision, but condemn those who refuse to carry it out. Even groups that mostly 
oppose same-sex marriage, Obergefell, and support Kim Davis follow this pattern, suggesting 
that even some of the most reluctant are willing to acquiesce, thus further providing 
contradictory evidence to the findings of Hoekstra and Segal (1996). 
Conclusion 
This project sought to examine the relationship between Court decisions and public 
opinion. My main objective was to investigate whether court decisions on culture war issues 
affect public opinion regarding these issues by measuring changes in support for same-sex 
marriage following Obergefell v. Hodges. I also sought to measure changes in support in 
Kentucky in order to determine whether Court decisions have a greater effect on the opinion of 
the individuals that are directly affected by them. By observing changes in the gaps in support 
between racial groups, religious groups, and parties, I intended to examine whether any of these 
groups are disproportionately affected by Court involvement.  
Because of data limitations, however, I was unable to test my hypotheses regarding 
changes in support among Kentuckians. I was unable to measure the effect of the Obergefell 
ruling on support for same-sex marriage in Kentucky. However, I was able to draw some 
conclusions based on state reactions to the decision. Contrary to my expectations, the majority of 
Kentuckians were willing to accept the ruling and believe it should be carried out. Despite 
widespread opposition to same-sex marriage and disapproval of the Obergefell ruling, the 
majority of Kentucky respondents condemned the actions of Kim Davis. This suggests that 
although they disagree with the decision, they are willing to acquiesce. Despite disapproval, 
noncompliance with a Court ruling is condemned by the majority. The reactions of residents of 
the state to Kim Davis’ actions oppose the conclusion made by Hoekstra and Segal (1996) who 
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stated that those who are directly affected by a decision are more likely to reject it. This 
willingness to acquiesce despite widespread disapproval is also reflected in the opinion of party 
members and affiliates and racial groups in the state. Examining the behavior of blacks and 
whites in the state before and after Court decisions provides support Gibson’s (2012) argument 
concerning discontent with the justice system among blacks. However, it also shows the black 
community’s aversion to infringements of rights granted to minority groups. Furthermore, 
measuring gaps in support between Republicans and Democrats on the national and state level, 
supports my hypothesis that this gap is wider on the national level because the majority in 
Kentucky remain opposed to same-sex marriage, thus supporting the notion of Kentucky 
exceptionalism. Observing party dynamics further affirms the assertion that Kentuckians are 
willing to acquiesce. Although some groups have somewhat disparate reactions, most follow a 
similar pattern, with more members accepting Obergefell than supporting same-sex marriage and 
even more condemning Kim Davis’ actions. Even among groups that are highly opposed to 
same-se marriage, this rings true, suggesting that, despite disapproval, residents are willing to 
accept the Obergefell decision and believe it should be implemented.  
On the national level, changes in support for same-sex marriage following Obergefell 
could not be determined because the data point following the ruling did not reach significance. 
However, evidence shows that Court decisions precede changes in support. Evidence shows that 
the Court’s decision in U.S. v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry as well as other lower court 
decisions occur prior to minor shifts in support for same-sex marriage. However, I cannot 
conclude that these decisions caused shifts in opinion. In fact, the amount of time between the 
polls preceding and following Court rulings leaves room for the influence of other variables. As I 
expected, the gaps in support between whites, Latinos, and blacks remained constant following 
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Obergefell, suggesting that the decision did not affect disparities among the groups and 
supporting my argument that differences in religion and religiosity drive these disparities. 
However, the gap between whites and blacks prior to landmark decisions widened, supporting 
the assertion that blacks are disproportionately resistant to Court involvement. Furthermore, 
contrary to my expectations, the gap between Republicans and Democrats widened following 
Obergefell, suggesting that Court decisions can spur partisan division. Among white evangelicals 
and white mainline Protestants, the gap in support for same-sex marriage decreased following 
Obergefell; however, party identification of the respondents used in the survey may have 
contributed to this decrease, suggesting that partisanship may be a better indicator of support for 
same-sex marriage than religious affiliation. 
[Figure 9] 
After conducting this research, I posit a similar view to that of Rosenberg (1991).  
Although I find that Court decisions precede changes in support for same-sex marriage, shifts in 
support were minute and could have been caused by other factors. Therefore, I conclude that it is 
unlikely to Court decisions are responsible for shifts in support. Figure 9 shows my prediction 
regarding consequences following Court involvement in the culture war. I argue that public 
opinion, ideology, and precedent inform Court decisions. Following these rulings, the opposition 
mobilizes, leading to changes in political representation. Elected officials will reflect the opinion 
of the opposition, which will lead to the passage of policies aimed at undermining the Court’s 
decision. This change in representation will lead to new judicial appointments. These appointees 
will reflect the ideology of the President that nominated them, who already represents the 
opposition. New legislation will be litigated and, because of the change in the Court’s 
composition, there will be a shift in the ideological tenor of the Court, which will lead to 
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modified precedent. During this process, public support will decline due to public education 
resulting from opposition mobilization. 
 At least on the state level, this process has already started. The Court strategically 
legalized same-sex marriage nationwide by granting certiorari to the 6th Circuit cases. Not only 
did the vast majority of Americans support same-sex marriage, but 37 states had already 
legalized same-sex marriage prior to Obergefell, suggesting that there was large consensus on 
this issue and a Court decision would not impose sweeping change on most citizens. 
Furthermore, four liberal justices along with a swing justice who has openly expressed support 
for the gay rights movement made up the majority in Obergefell. Also, the Court had already set 
precedent regarding LGBT rights with its decisions in Lawrence and Windsor, whose majority 
opinions were also written by Justice Kennedy. After the decision, the conservative opposition 
mobilized, rallying behind Kim Davis. Conservative politicians rallied around her as well, 
praising her bravery, condemning the federal involvement in marriage, and vowing to protect 
religious liberty.  
In Kentucky, after Bevin’s win and the Republicans sweeping victory, laws were 
proposed that were not only aimed at protecting the religious liberties of county clerks, but could 
also undermine previous gains for the LGBT community. For example, the Kentucky Senate 
passed SB 180, which allows businesses to deny services to individuals if they deem that service 
a violation of their religious beliefs (Chieves 2016). Other states have enacted similar laws. For 
example, North Carolina passed a law preventing local governments from passing ordinances 
allowing transgender people to use the bathroom corresponding to the gender with they identify 
with (Kopan and Scott 2016). I expect this backlash to continue, thus rolling back any gains the 
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LGBT community once enjoyed and possibly spilling over into other social movements (i.e. civil 
rights and women’s rights).  
 Future research could test my prediction regarding Court involvement in the culture war 
by measuring changes in support for same-sex marriage and observing backlash following 
Obergefell over a longer period of time. Research could also test my hypotheses concerning the 
effect of media framing, exposure to the LGBT community, and religion on support for same-sex 
marriage. Studies could track a group of people over time to see if their exposure to the LGBT 
community has changed and how that has changed attitudes toward same-sex marriage. 
Researchers could also test changes in support for same-sex marriage after exposing individuals 
to traditional/moral frames or equality frames communicated in news articles or after watching 
shows like Ellen or Modern Family in order to test whether the media’s depiction of the LGBT 
community affects support for same-sex marriage.  
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Table 1:  Description of Polls 
Poll Source Date of Poll/ 
Methodology 
Number of 
Respondents/
Margin of 
Error 
Question Wording Answer Categories 
Pew Research 
Center 
March 13-17, 
2013 
 
Random digit 
dialing 
 
 
1,501 adults 
 
±2.9% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
 
Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally? 
 
strongly favor 
favor  
strongly oppose  
oppose 
don’t know/refused 
May 1-5, 2013 
 
1,504 adults 
 
±2.9% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally? 
 
strongly favor 
favor  
strongly oppose  
oppose 
don’t know/refused 
February 12-
26, 2014 
 
Random digit 
dialing 
 
3,338 adults 
 
±2.0% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally? 
 
strongly favor 
favor  
strongly oppose  
oppose 
don’t know/refused 
September 2-
9, 2014 
 
Random digit 
dialing 
 
2,002 adults 
 
±2.5% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally? 
 
strongly favor 
favor  
strongly oppose  
oppose 
don’t know/refused 
May 12-18, 
2015 
 
Random digit 
dialing 
 
2,002 adults 
 
±2.5% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally? 
 
strongly favor 
favor  
strongly oppose  
oppose 
don’t know/refused 
July 14-20, 
2015 
 
Random digit 
dialing 
2,002 adults 
 
±2.5% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you strongly favor, 
favor, oppose, or strongly 
oppose allowing gays and 
lesbians to marry legally? 
 
strongly favor 
favor  
strongly oppose  
oppose 
don’t know/refused 
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Bluegrass Poll January 30-
February 4, 
2014 
 
Questionnaire- 
cell phones 
Random digit 
dialing- home 
phones 
 
1,200 adults 
 
±3% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
 
Do you favor or oppose 
allowing gays and lesbians 
to marry in Kentucky? 
 
 
favor 
oppose 
not sure 
 
July 18- July 
23, 2014 
 
Questionnaire- 
cell phones 
Random digit 
dialing- home 
phones 
 
800 adults 
 
±3.7% with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you favor or oppose 
allowing gays and lesbians 
to marry in Kentucky? 
 
 
favor 
oppose  
not sure 
 
March 3-8, 
2015 
 
hones 
Random digit 
dialing- home 
phones 
 
2,002 adults 
 
±2.3 with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
 
Do you favor or oppose 
allowing gays and lesbians 
to marry in Kentucky? 
 
 
favor  
oppose  
not sure 
 
July 22-28, 
2015 
 
Questionnaire- 
cell phones 
Random digit 
dialing- home 
phones 
1,000 adults 
 
±3.4 with a 
95% 
confidence 
level 
Do you agree or disagree 
with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's recent ruling which 
made gay marriage legal 
nationwide? 
 
agree 
disagree 
not sure 
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Table 2: Party Registration/Affiliation and Support for Same-Sex Marriage and Opinion on 
Issuing Marriage Licenses 
 
Party Registration Party Affiliation 
 Re
ps. 
Dems. Strong 
Rep. 
Rep. Ind. 
lean 
Rep. 
Ind. Ind. 
lean 
Dem. 
Dem.  Strong 
Dem. 
March 
2015 
(before 
Obergefell) 
 
19 
 
43 
 
10 
 
17 
 
 
27 
 
35 
 
49 
 
44 
 
64 
July  
2015 
(after 
Obergefell) 
 
23 
 
47 
 
5 
 
23 
 
30 
 
27 
 
62 
 
48 
 
62 
(higher values indicate support for Davis issuing licenses) 
Sept. 2015  
35 
 
62 
 
24 
 
33 
 
37 
 
54 
 
79 
 
65 
 
77 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Bluegrass Poll (March 2015, July 2015, September 2015). In 
March 2015, respondents were asked, “Do you favor oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry 
in Kentucky? In July 2015, respondents were asked “Do you agree or disagree with the U.S. 
Supreme Court's recent ruling which made gay marriage legal nationwide?” In September 2015, 
respondents were told, “Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis has refused to issue marriage licenses 
to gay and lesbian couples, saying she objects on religious grounds. Do you think she should or 
should not be required to issue them?” 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Figure 3 
 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Pew Research Center (March 2013 through July 2015). 
Respondents were asked, “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry legally?” 
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Figure 4 
 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Pew Research Center (March 2013 through July 2015). 
Respondents were asked, “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry legally?” 
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Figure 5 
 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Pew Research Center (March 2013 through July 2015). 
Respondents were asked, “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry legally?” 
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Figure 6 
 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Pew Research Center (March 2013 through July 2015). 
Respondents were asked, “Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose allowing 
gays and lesbians to marry legally?” 
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Figure 7 
 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Bluegrass Poll (January 2014 through March 2015). 
Respondents were asked, “Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry in 
Kentucky? 
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Data are state estimates from the Williams Institute (2000-2015). 
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Figure 9 
 
 
Notes:  Data are drawn from the Bluegrass Poll (January 2014 through March 2015). 
Respondents were asked, “Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry in 
Kentucky? 
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